

Language and the Ineffable Aspect of the Bodymind

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Editor's note: In this article Mark Replinger grapples courageously with the issue of language in relation to experience in life, therapy and the body-mind we employ in Hakomi. Of particular import, and cause for humility for therapists, he dialogues with the postmodern caution that language can be not only be descriptive, but prescriptive. There is the constant danger that the words we use to understand can overlay another's experience with an abstract theory that results in non-understanding, non-contact, and the subversion of the healing impulse.

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ABSTRACT: This essay explores the often incongruent relationship between language and deep bodymind experience, with a view toward opening space in which to create and explore new bodymind concepts. The emphasis is on ways that language often fails to adequately represent bodymind phenomena, obscuring direct apprehensions of bodymind experience, with some suggestions for what veridical bodymind concepts might look like.

The Ineffable

The use of old, formal concepts to explain the new music might be acceptable if only the old categories were employed to demonstrate the difficulty of expressing the strangeness of the new in terms of the familiar. . . . One is almost tempted to believe that in the absence of a newly discovered technique every explanation of music in terms of a static material principle suppresses the best and distorts the work by forcing it into the straitjacket of an antiquated framework (Adorno, 1998, p. 11).

We understand the ineffable, not as that which is beyond our grasp merely for its refusal to be captured in verbal language, but that which must be respected and held in a specific way, with a special kind of recognition. One definition in the Oxford Universal Dictionary (1933) is "*that which must not be uttered.*" This usage, whose first appearance is dated 1597, suggests some occult or supernatural reference, resonant with the numinous quality of our most deeply felt experiences. In countenancing an ineffable register of experience, we gain an image, some sort of marker for the nonverbal dimension of experience, of us. Here the more common usage of ineffable, "*that which cannot be expressed in words*" comes into play with the one cited above: this double meaning speaks to the experience of knowing that something is there that resists verbal formulation, and yet if verbal formulation *is* engaged, the thing is lost or changed; it becomes a pale facsimile of what it was.

The notion that we are constituted by language—that consciousness and the self owe their instantiation to language, that they are produced upon linguistic cognitive processes—has always felt somehow stultifying; although difficult to refute, it does not inspire visceral conviction.

The idea that "it is *language* that is the primary condition of all human experience" (Ricoeur, cited in Johanson, 1996) has been a dominant view. But if some sense of the insufficiency or oppressiveness of this hypothesis is shared, it may be edifying to read the following, from Antonio Damasio's *The Feeling of What Happens* (1999):

Language—that is, words and sentences—is a translation of something else, a conversion from nonlinguistic images which stand for entities, events, relationships, and inferences. If language operates for the self and for consciousness in the same way that it operates for everything else, that is, by symbolizing in words and sentences what exists first in nonverbal form, then there must be a nonverbal self and a nonverbal knowing for which the words "I" and "me" or the phrase "I know" are the appropriate translations, in any language. I believe it is legitimate to take the phrase "I know" and deduce from it the presence of a nonverbal image of knowing centered on a self that precedes and motivates that verbal phrase.

The idea that the self and consciousness should emerge *after* language, and would be a direct construction of language, is not likely to be correct. Language does not come out of nothing. Language gives us names for things. If self and consciousness were born *de novo* from language, they would constitute the sole instance of words without an underlying concept.

Given our supreme language gift, most of the ingredients of consciousness, from objects to inferences, can be translated into language, and for us, at this point in the history of nature and the history of each individual, the basic process of consciousness is relentlessly translated by language, covered by it, if you will. Language is a major contributor to the high-level form of consciousness which we are using at this very moment, and which I call extended

Mark Repplinger

consciousness. Because of this, it does require a major effort to imagine what lies behind language, but the effort must be made (pp. 107-08).

As we suffer through questions posed under the "mind-body problem" and their intersection with linguistic theories, our direct apprehension of the bodymind, our *experience*, is elided in a flow of unsettling words. We lose touch, forgetting that it simply and miraculously exists. Aline LaPierre has suggested that "the lack of language available to support the emergence of the body's own voice is a real clinical obstacle" (2007, p. 38). In thinking the bodymind we continually strive to overcome the alexithymic obstructions inherent in previous theoretical constructions and linguistic process itself. But exactly how this striving takes place deserves a look. This paper aims at clarifying some of the obstacles to the body's own voice; it is offered as a contribution toward creating more transparent, more direct metaphors and concepts of the bodymind.

A key phrase in the quotation above is "*a nonverbal image of knowing centered on a self that precedes and motivates that verbal phrase.*" If I read him correctly, the phenomenological apprehension of this "what lies behind language" receives an articulation in Gilles Deleuze:

Let us return for a moment to those states of experience that, at a certain point, must not be translated into mere representations or fantasies, must not be transmitted by legal, contractual or institutional codes, must not be exchanged or bartered away, but on the contrary, must be seen as a dynamic flux that carries us away even further outside. This is precisely the process of intensity, of intensities. The state of experience is not subjective in origin, at least not inevitably so. Moreover, it is not individual. It is a continuous flux and the disruption of flux, and each pulsional intensity necessarily bears a relation to another intensity, a point of contact and transmission. *This* is what underlies all codes, what escapes all codes, and it is what the codes themselves seek to translate, convert, and mint anew. . . . Intensity refers neither to the signifier (the represented word) nor to the signified (the represented thing) (Deleuze, 1977, p. 146).

"Intensities" has a special intensive ring, producing an image of organismic events not bound by the categories of "thought," "language," "belief," "sense modality," nor by the binarisms subjective-objective, conscious-unconscious, organic-inorganic. We recognize that this *intensity* suffers through an articulation process, or it remains unarticulated. Failing to find words, it remains there, in some capacity, suffering mutely, or perhaps happy to have escaped signification and death. Intensities are, can we say, ineffable?

Now the suggestion that we attend to a class of things ineffable is not intended as an injunction; no proscription of speech is urged, and of course no one is going to stop trying

to articulate the ineffable anyway, nor should they. The ineffable is safe, in a way, because according to the strict definition, it *cannot* be spoken; it is "what escapes all codes, and it is what the codes themselves seek to translate, convert, and mint anew" (Deleuze, above). But something is incomplete in our theory of persons, our theory of the bodymind: its ineffable aspect. The assertion here is that the ineffable refers us to something of great interest, something that most definitely reflects upon clinical aims and spiritual aspirations as well: a class of things about which it makes sense to say that they are, paradoxically it seems, that which *cannot* be spoken, and that which *must not* be spoken, and yet they *want* to be spoken—the *body's own voice wants to emerge*.

Thus articulating, and then *holding*, a category of "the ineffable," seems an important component in a veridical explication of verbal process vis-à-vis the bodymind, and a necessary step in countering the logorrhea and confabulation inherent in so much psychological theorizing. For many years we have referred to this other, "ineffable" space with the term "unconscious," but this word has become so freighted with various meanings that we have to wonder if it can be reliably used to evoke what we intend;¹ so many things have agglomerated to it over the years that we should perhaps ask if it even any longer makes sense. The "where it comes from": *that* is what is intended by "ineffable." It refers us to some place other than words, a place both impacted by language and out of which language emerges—it refers us directly to the bodymind. The ineffable is a moment in a process: what is ineffable may become effable at some future time; we acknowledge our knowing for what it is, in its conjunctions and disjunctions across all realms of experience, and offer a cognitive gesture of recognition toward the ineffable.

A Brief History

In light of the alienations that language can produce in us (cf. Johanson, 1996), it seems clear that we need to differentiate a *veridically* ineffable, i.e., legitimately, profoundly ineffable, from that which is improperly, wrong-headedly *rendered speechless*, lost in a tide of verbiage that captures human being, precluding access to its ineffable source. In so many encounters with psychological theories, academically, clinically, there is often a sense of a template being placed over experience, and that one is tacitly being urged to make experience fit the template, to see in the model one's own mind, one's own self. When these models are misused in the consulting room, the urging is no longer tacit; it can be very direct. Successive encounters with psychological theories come to have an alienating, even harrowing quality. The hoped-for cure begins to look worse than the disease, if that were possible.

. . . if I say of myself [for instance] that I am an introvert, I am likely to be caught in my own subject-predicate trap. Even the inner self—my self—becomes burdened with the onus of actually being an introvert

Mark Replinger

or of finding some way to be rid of the introversion that has climbed on my back. What has happened is that I named myself with a name and, having done so, too quickly forgot who invented the name and what he had on his mind at the time. From now on I try frantically to cope with what I have called myself. Moreover, my family and friends are often willing to join in the struggle (Kelly, 1969, p. 71).

George Kelly sums up a process of *predication*, that potentially alienating linguistic-organismic operation by which one tries to apprehend oneself through some idea, label, concept, nominalization, or "narrative." Predication is something we easily become party to when we try to name things about ourselves and others. And it is innocuous enough, and can even have happy results in everyday life. But it has the potential to go grievously wrong when psychological theories partake of this predication process, and particularly when unseen, outside claims are made upon personhood, and in turn, the person:

People have always fallen into the trap of interpreting their experience only through stereotyped concepts whereby the actual stream of experience is largely missed. . . . Already today, even without a science of psychology, very many people feel constrained to interpret themselves as the concepts and contents given us by Freud or by the Sunday-magazine test-yourself psychology. Young people take vocational tests to find out what their interests are, as if a test could substitute for a direct differentiation of their own actual experiencing of interest. And if experiencing and its directly felt significances even now struggle against the imposition of these constructs, *we must indeed fear that attempts at scientific concepts could rigidify, stereotype, and destroy the integrity of experiencing* (Gendlin 1997, p. 17-18, italics added).

In strict scientific description and explanation, the human element is seen, correctly, as error, a hindrance to clear concepts; it is a projection from the subjective realm onto the phenomena at hand, in metaphors that carry errant entailments. But just as science must refuse anthropomorphic constructions for the sake of its endeavor, so too does an opposite contingency appear: The self or subject has its own prerogatives, its own sovereignty. In the movement from the strictly scientific context to the human, some of the attributes of scientific thinking can be carried over to the specifically human where they then have the potential to perform alienating, depersonalizing functions upon subjective experience, as evidenced here:

'Subjectivity' is what stands, for Descartes and Galileo, between the knower and an accurate perception of the world. It is the barrier that casts the shadow of Cartesian anxiety, the possibility that our human capabilities may be such that we may never be able to reach the ordinary, changing world unless, as Dewey put it, "the mind were protected against itself." What it needs to be protected against is its own subjectivity (Bordo, 1987, p. 51).

Captivated by the fascinations of the scientific milieu in which we live, the subject takes himself to be an object like the rest and thereby forgets his subjectivity. Thus he becomes blocked from true speech . . . by being caught behind a "language barrier" of empty words, whose thickness is measurable "by the statistically determined pounds of printed paper, miles of record grooves, and hours of radio broadcasting that the said culture produces per head (Lacan, 1977)" (Muller & Richardson, 1982, p. 80).

Jurgen Habermas saw "the self-emancipatory process as hypothesized to occur in the psychoanalytic 'movement of self-reflection' as fundamentally alien to the methodological and ontological categories featured by the natural sciences" (Grunbaum, 1984, p. 8). Extending this notion further, the natural sciences orientation could not have been helped by the enthusiasms of behaviorism, which presented itself as a unified paradigm but excluded everything of interest within the hermeneutic tradition of psychology. This was the "science" of psychology that Ilham Dilman describes as "trimming the head to fit the cap" (Dilman, 1994, p. 145). It was perhaps following certain well-known abuses, not only under behaviorism, that some people became less inclined toward the natural science orientation in psychology, which seemed to have nothing to recommend itself to anyone whose appreciation of the discipline focused on the ways that, from the perspective of intellectual history, psychology advanced understandings that were formerly sought in philosophy, literature and the spiritual disciplines.

We have, however, moved a long way from where many of our current psychological concepts began. Roger Sperry wrote that psychology under the cognitive revolution was able to claim a "bidirectional determinism," in which conscious states are attributed causal status, "legitimiz[ing] what Carl Rogers used to call 'subjective knowing,' providing a long-sought theoretical foundation not only for cognitive but also for humanistic and social psychology" (1995). We can now visualize the interaction of intentional states and biological operation of the brain through imaging technology as we see blood flow and glucose metabolism being directed to parts of the brain through the mediation of conscious attention. What we are witnessing, in one aspect, is the biological operation of language.

The Autobiography of a Theory

Two complementary areas of interest, roughly consonant with the bottom-up/top-down distinction and its inherent bi-directionality, present themselves to the bodymind vis-à-vis language. The first concerns that which purportedly cannot be represented in language, the "ineffable," as touched on above. The second concerns language's performativity with regard to subjective experience and states of consciousness. De Saussure's signifier-signified-referent schema, alluded to in the quotation of Deleuze above, inherently excludes contact with the world through language²—the referent is to the signified as the noumena is to the phenomena: it cannot

Mark Replinger

be known. But in visualizing the embodied operation of language, the distinction between signified and referent seems insensible: the "referent" of "language" is the lived experience (good and bad) that language produces in us. Bodymind concepts and imagery are directed primarily toward this aspect of language: its organic situatedness—language in life, *in vivo*.

Taking "language" as a biological event—situated in organismic process, motivated upon organismic desire³—suggests several novel moves that a self or subject might make in its encounter, sometimes confrontation, with the theories of mind, self, subjectivity that purport to represent and explicate it. These moves are sensible, perhaps, if they are made in the explicit awareness of both language's ultimate biological origin, and the autobiographical element in all theorizing, often pushed out of sight under objectivist presumptions (Atwood & Stolorow, 1991). Many unseen things are enfolded into a theory. One way of drawing them out is to consider a theory as itself a virtual subject, which then in turn exercises powers of subjectivation upon those who encounter and engage it. Like a person, theory is both *subject*—it constitutes a standpoint from which it speaks—and *subjectivated*—it takes imprints from without which constitute it. Theory has a lineage, a genealogy, and an autobiography implicit in it. And it is signed. This "subject" is, however, often much larger and ungainly than any one or several persons whose names are affixed to it.

We can carry the analogy further using clinical concepts still very much in use: we recognize a cathexis of theory. There is a "libidinal investment." Theory is a "mother," for better and for worse; in the Winnicottian sense, good and bad. Theory organizes experience, it provides safety and containment. And theory can also be disorganizing, pathogenic/iatrogenic. *Bad theory is bad mirroring.* We know the moments in which a dreary voice derisively comments on our thoughts, feelings and actions. And although we may try to refute them or cave in to their predication, rarely do these efforts take us outside. But all too often in clinical encounters this voice is joined by another, perhaps only surreptitiously commenting and construing, whose origins can be traced to various places—autobiographical elements of theories which have cloaked themselves as "absolutes and universals" (Atwood & Stolorow, 1991, p. 4), and the fundamental assumptions of Newtonian science that inform psychological theories. This voice speaks from the standpoint of an unseen third party, with the interests of a third party.⁴ Its discourse has the same effect as a hostile alienating object. The client finds they have become involved in a nightmare of repetition—the *awfulness of not being recognized*.

With the exclusions and misconstruals of conscious experience—artifacts of the confrontation between subjective human reality and (now fading) assumptions of Newtonian science—sensible bodymind concepts within psychology were either impossible or very difficult.⁵ One of

the most unfortunate things about prior psychological conceptions of the human being, i.e., the bodymind, comes into focus in the light of body-centered notions of personhood: the way in which body-self representations (feelings, intensities) were pejoratively shunted to the categories "regression," "narcissism," "the infantile" (Deleuze & Guatarri, 1987) and thus in practice led the person away from a bodily re-personalization at the very moment that body-self representations manifest (cf. Marlock & Weiss, 2006, p. 52).⁶ The articulations that arise out of wholeness, visceral connection, and calm that a body can have when resonated by a sympathetic figure are foreclosed under a needless judgment.

Although speaking of these things now may be somewhat anachronistic, these reflections suggest that we be very lucid if we want to avoid capturing what are largely ineffable processes in non-veridical, and thereby non-resonant, affectively-disconnected series of words. Metaphorically humanizing theory in this way, as prompted by the organic situatedness of linguistic process, enables us to more clearly countenance a need for consistency and congruence throughout: within and between the metatheory, the clinical theory, and in the person of the therapist, (Rogers, 1951) whose "object" (theory) must *veridically* support and sustain both the therapist and client through the endeavor (Casement, 1991).

Clear and Distinct Ideas

Now what would this consistency consist of? For that we have to consider, always, the embodied operation of theory. We have to look at psychological theories as they actually work, considering them from a *realpsychologie* perspective, if you will, a place where we become concerned with the actual effect that a given theory of mind has upon the individual persons into whom it is inculcated, either explicitly, as in a direct assertion of "how things are" per the given theory, or implicitly, as when a given metapsychology underlies and structures the clinical inquiry.

We can formulate veridical bodymind concepts if this formulation is done in the explicit awareness that our concepts actually instantiate something in the organism, in the bodymind. The theories, the concepts, the language do not merely (attempt to) *represent* a situation, they also *do something* to or within that very situation. This has always been the case, but the case has not always been made. This concern becomes particularly acute when we are interested in formulating bodymind concepts: the situation that the bodymind theory seeks to represent is *itself* affected strongly by that very theory.

Many of the effects of any given theory of mind *upon a mind*, upon subjectivity, i.e., the being of the self, are not immediately apparent. While any theory of mind and the clinical theory that it is based on it may "seem like the thing to do at the time," the subjectivating effects of the theory

itself—as it acts upon processes of conception and perception—are not always known by the theory when it is formulated, and, historically at least, have had to be played out in time. As a theory gains currency, description surreptitiously, insidiously becomes prescription as the mind organizes around the model of itself, naively deriving, deducing its experience from the model, unaware of the process being enacted on and through it. This discussion has shown, hopefully, that caution lies in the tendency for theory to produce alienated conditions: depersonalization, *disembodiment*.⁷ A veridical bodymind theory operates in the explicit awareness of bidirectional causality, of self-reflexivity: the ways in which the bodymind is affected by the theory (of) itself.

In one way, it is our naive experience itself that induces the mind-body split and keeps us from a direct, veridical apprehension of ourselves as a bodymind. "We all have constant phenomenological experience that reinforces the illusion of a disembodied Subject" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 563).⁸ The world appears to us with a sufficient degree of reality, that is, naively real in itself, *real enough*, without our perceiving the work of the perceptual apparatus itself. But because we do not attend to that which within our bodies creates our experience, we gain the illusion of a radically free and separate something—"mind" as separate from the body, out of which have developed concepts of spiritual substance as distinct from material substance, i.e., the whole "mind-body problem." It is perhaps in this connection that we are prompted to wonder about the meaning of something in Spinoza: "*The human mind is the idea of the human body*"⁹ (cited in Damasio, 2003, p. 12).

A language of the bodymind seeks simplification that preserves complexity, compression in terse formulations which have a prismatic quality; metaphors matrixed in a multiplicity of meanings gaining sense across contexts; imagery motivating organismic cohesion and experience of the bodymind as a single thing. Unseen exigencies are brought into the space of the visualizable, the articulable, the transmissible. *It takes the form that it takes out of the necessity of its idea . . .*

. . . some concepts must be indicated by an extraordinary and sometimes even barbarous or shocking word, whereas others make do with an ordinary, everyday word that is filled with harmonics so distant that it risks being imperceptible to a nonphilosophical ear. Some concepts call for archaisms, and others for neologisms, shot through with almost crazy etymological exercises: etymology is like a specifically philosophical athleticism. In each case there must be a strange necessity for these words and for their choice, like an element of style. The concept's baptism calls for a specifically philosophical taste that proceeds with violence or by insinuation and constitutes a philosophical language within language—not just a vocabulary but a syntax that attains the sublime or a great beauty (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 7-8).

Who is the one who recognizes this "strange necessity for these words and their choice?" It is to that agent that our inquiries are directed—this sometimes nascent subject who nevertheless lives there, and has always lived there. Can we create bodymind concepts which "penetrate . . . to the physical sources of life, modif[ying] the unconscious and generalizable organism in which the idea is latent"? (Proust, 1982, p. 579). Would that "[p]eople themselves discover and thereby claim their own modes of organization" (Johanson, 1999). *Creating one's own concepts out of one's own experience is intrepid*. Verification of the concept's sensibility comes not in its congruence with a theoretical edifice, but is left instead to those who would experiment by testing its veridicality in their own experience. It would be a tenet of *this* theory that the words and phrases be derived from the immediate situation in which they are going to be used, in that *sui generis* instance,¹⁰ each instance of a veridical bodymind formulation is an event, a key moment in the history of the mind's struggle to exist. The energies bound up in theoretical reifications are released when lived experience (always in some measure ineffable) is properly recognized as the source *and* the aim of our efforts.

Notes

1. "Take psychoanalysis as an example . . . it subjects the unconscious to arborescent structures, hierarchical graphs, recapitulatory memories. . . not only in its theory but in its practice of calculation and treatment. Psychoanalysis cannot change its method in this regard: it bases its dictatorial power upon a dictatorial conception of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis's margin of maneuverability is therefore very limited."

Which then continues, making an important point for theories of the bodymind:

". . . For both statements and desires [as expressed by the client], the issue is never to reduce the unconscious or to interpret it or to make it signify. . . . The issue is to *produce the unconscious*, and with it new statements, different desires: the rhizome is precisely this production of the unconscious" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 17-18).

2. "Language can thus be experienced as a form of splitting, isolating from some authentic realm of essential concerns. . . . *Not the least interesting aspect of contemporary culture is that many believe simultaneously that language articulates the world and that language cannot reach the world*" (Thiher, cited in Johanson, 1996, italics added).
3. "A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. . . . There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic

community. Language is, in Weinreich's words, "an essentially heterogeneous reality." There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity. . . . It is impossible to break a language down into internal structural elements, an undertaking not fundamentally different from a search for roots. There is always something genealogical about a tree. It is not a method for the people. A method of the rhizome type, on the contrary, *can analyze language only by decentering it onto other dimensions and registers*. A language is never closed upon itself..." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp.7-8, italics added).

To "analyze language only by decentering it onto other dimensions and registers": onto the bodymind, the organism out of which it arises.

4. "[T]he taste for replacing real relations between forces by an abstract relation which is supposed to express them all, as a measure, seems to be an integral part of science and also of philosophy. . . . Now, in this abstract relation, whatever it is, we always end up replacing real activities (creating, speaking, loving etc.) by the third party's perspective on these activities: the essence of an activity is confused with the gains of a third party, which he claims that he ought to profit from, whose benefits he claims the right to reap..." (Deleuze, 1983, p. 74).
5. "No aspect of the human mind is easy to investigate, and for those who wish to understand the biological underpinnings of the mind, consciousness is generally regarded as the towering problem, in spite of the fact that the definition of the problem may vary considerably from investigator to investigator. If elucidating mind is the last frontier of the life sciences, consciousness often seems like the last mystery in the elucidation of mind" (Damasio, 1999, p. 4).
6. For instance, "Self Psychology is the only branch of psychoanalysis that doesn't denunciate the experience of bliss as regressive or pathological" (Marlock & Weiss, 2006).
7. Deleuze and Guattari describe a problem with theory, as it is often done:
"It is . . . like a photograph or X ray that begins by selecting and isolating, by artificial means such as colorations or other restrictive procedures, what it intends to reproduce. The imitator always creates the model, and attracts it. . . . It has organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of signification and subjectification belonging to it . . . and when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself. . . . It injects redundancies and propagates them. What [it] reproduces are only the impasses, blockages. . . points of structuration (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 13).
8. "In virtually all of our acts of perception, the bodily organs of perception (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin) are not what we are attending to. For example, when we walk down the street and look at a house, we are normally not attending to our eyes, much less to the visual system of our brains. The fact that what we attend to is rarely *what we perceive with* gives the illusion that mental acts occur independent of the unnoticed body" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 562, italics added).

9. "Of great importance. . . was [Spinoza's] notion that both the mind and the body were parallel attributes (call them manifestations) of the very same substance. At the very least, by refusing to ground mind and body on different substances, Spinoza was serving notice of his opposition to the view of the mind-body problem that prevailed in his time. His dissent stood out in a sea of conformity. More intriguing, however, was his notion that *the human mind is the idea of the human body*. This raised an arresting possibility. Spinoza might have intuited the principles behind the natural mechanisms responsible for the parallel manifestations of mind and body. As I shall discuss later, I am convinced that mental processes are grounded in the brain's mappings of the body, collections of neural patterns that portray responses to events that cause emotions and feelings. Nothing could have been more comforting than coming across this statement of Spinoza's and wondering about its possible meaning" (Damasio, 2003, p. 12)
10. "So often in therapy, we find that a word and/or inflection communicates one meaning to one person and something else to another. We shine the light of mindfulness on these subtle choices bringing them from unconsciousness to consciousness much like the poet chooses his or her words and crafts the line to embody meaning" (Douglas, 2007).

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Mark Replinger

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